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Abstract
This paper shows how informed financial intermediaries can reduce
their trading competition by designing optimal incentive compatible
contracts for the sale of information. With fund management con-
tracts – indirect sale of information – banks can credibly commit to
collaborate and add noise into prices. This is a way to circumvent the
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) paradox: when information is costly, by
commiting to add noise, the banks can recover the cost of collecting
information and enter the market. By contrast, when information is
costless, even with a large number of sellers of information entering
the market prices are not fully informative.
JEL Classification: G14-G24-D43-D82
Keywords: banks, contracts, fund management, market efficiency,
noise.
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1. Introduction
Financial intermediaries such as commercial banks, investment banks,
securities houses and rating agencies all invest in the collection of informa-
tion. In fact, producing information and selling it is considered a raison
d’etre for financial intermediation (see Allen (1990) and Ramakrishan and
Thakor (1984)). Another purpose of information generation is trading. In
particular, intermediaries use information i) for their proprietary trading
activities, ii) for managing funds on behalf of their clients (indirect sale of
information), and iii) for giving trading recommendations (direct sale of in-
formation) 1. We know quite a bit about when information collection will be
profitable and when it will not. In the classical literature on competition and
aggregation of information, Kyle (1984) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)
have shown that in the case of imperfect competition prices become efficient
as the number of traders goes to infinity. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) have
shown that when a large number of perfectly competitive agents trade in the
market, prices fully reveal their private information. Hence, no profit can
be earned on collecting costly information, unless prices represent a noisy
signal of the information of the informed agents.
Financial institutions collect information, and some are simultaneously
engaged in proprietary trading activities and in indirect sales of information.
1The latter two cases constitute sales of information. Admati and Pfleiderer (1986)
have defined two ways of buying information: by subscribing to newsletters or bulletins
(direct sale of information), or by signing a contract with a financial institution which
manages an investment fund on behalf of its client (indirect sale of information)
This duality in the use of the information inside the firm could tempt finan-
cial intermediaries to add noise to the signal they sell in order to enhance
the profitability of their own trades. A potential conflict of interest thus
arises between the bank and the client who delegates his money to the fund
manager.2
Competition among intermediaries may temper these incentives, but it
is not clear that it will eliminate them. The interesting question this raises
is: what kinds of contracts will emerge to resolve this conflict of interest in
a competitive financial intermediation market?
In this paper we adress this question by considering competitive financial
intermediairies who trade at the same time for their own account and for
their clients. This is in contrast to Biais and Germain (2002) who consider
contracts in the case of a monopolistic information seller. The intended
contribution of this paper is to show that fund management contracts 3allow
financial intermediaries to collude and commit to add noise into prices to
increase their profits. We show then how bankers can diminish competition
2Indeed, recent financial scandals have shown how financial intermediairies can use
information in a strategic way, for example when financial analysts issued systematically
bullish recommandations on stocks of companies that are clients of the banks: Michaely
and Womack (1999) provide empirical evidence of such a type of conflict.
3In this paper we assume that contracts are public information. It is indeed the case
that contracts proposed by bankers to the clients for fund managment are observable.
Fund management contracts are usually standardized and the type of contract proposed
by fund managers or hedge funds are in most cases known by the market. This information
is usually not private.
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between their trading divisions via fund management contracts.
There are not many empirical papers documenting collusion in finance.
Marsh (1998, 1999) gives empirical evidence of implicit collusion between
investment banks for the underwriting of new issues. He shows that this
financial service is overpriced and sub-underwriting investors make excess
profits. As in fund management activities, contracts are public informa-
tion.4 Christie and Schultz (1994) also document collusion but between the
market makers on the NASDAQ. We show that in the case of fund man-
agement, the introduction of public contracts allows the banks to collude
and to reduce competition and diminish the informativeness of prices. The
banking industry is then able to create an endogenous noise in the market
in addition to the exogenous noise of the liquidity traders.
In particular, we show that there is a set of contracts which:i) allow
financial institutions to commit to add an optimal level of noise in the mar-
ket, ii) increase the profitability of the combined trades of the proprietary
trading and the funds managed and iii) address the competition problem be-
tween these institutions by increasing their aggregate profit. In this model,
without sales of information, prices are fully revealing as soon as two com-
petitors are trading in the market, which makes their individual expected
profits zero. In this case, as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), prices fully
reveal the private information, and if collection of information is costly no-
4These arguments have been taken seriously by the Office of Fair Trading and the
Monopolies and Mergers Commision in the UK, see Research Paper 6, Office of Fair
Trading.
3
body will do it ; this is the same result as the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
paradox but with imperfectly competitive agents. Introducing the possi-
bility of indirectly selling information is a way to circumvent the paradox
because financial institutions can now credibly commit to add noise. Pareto
optimality is restored due to the contracts used, and banks can collect costly
information. Selling information is thus a way to strategically endogenize
the amount of noise in the market.
Different papers are related to this study. Fishman and Hagerty (1995)
have analyzed competition if information is sold directly, not through a fund
like in this paper. They show that by selling information the informed agent
can commit to trade aggressively and extract a larger part of the profit. Ad-
mati and Pfleiderer (1986) analyze also direct sales of information and show
that the informed party adds noise to the signals he sells in order to reduce
the sensitivity of prices to trades. They assume that the precision of the sig-
nal is contractible, and analyze contracts whereby the fees paid to the seller
of information are a function of this precision. This is different from this
paper where the remuneration of the information seller is contingent on the
profits of the fund. Allen (1990) studies the reliability problem when infor-
mation is sold. He shows how this creates an opportunity for intermediation
as in Leland and Pyle (1977). In this paper we do not address the reliability
problem as the ability to collect information and the ability to use it are
assumed to be the same for the banks. Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984)
analyze the sufficiency conditions for coalitions for information producers
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to arise endogenously in a competitive equilibrium. Our paper is similar
to Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) in that we also consider situations in
which it is optimal to collaborate and sell information. The difference is
that, unlike Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), we also consider proprietary
trading by intermediaries. In a different setup Zurita (2004) shows that the
existence of intermediaries in financial markets is necessary to overcome ad-
verse selection problems when utility traders and speculators trade in the
market.
In Section 2 we study the competition between N banks and derive the
optimal contracts. In Section 3 we study competition when the number of
banks is large and information is costless. In Section 4 we endogenize the
amount of noise and the number of banks when information is costly. In
Section 5 we study the robustness of our model. Finally in Section 6 we
derive some concluding remarks. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2. Competition among N sellers
2.1. The model
There is one risky asset v˜ and one riskless asset normalized to zero.
There are two equiprobable states of the world, u = v¯ + ε and d = v¯ − ε,
where ε is a positive real number. There are three types of agents in the
market:
• N risk neutral informed traders, perfectly informed, who submit an
5
order Xj(v˜) = ωj, j = 1, 2, ...N ,
• noise traders who transmit equiprobable orders ωl = (L, 0,−L),
• competitive risk neutral market makers, who observe the orders ω =
(ω1, ..., ωN , ωl), where orders are anonymous.
5 Because of anonimity
the market-makers cannot ascertain the origin of the different orders
they receive. Market-makers quote:
P (ω) = E(v˜|ω)
The microstructure is different from Kyle (1985). Indeed, the market
makers do not observe the sum of all the orders but the different orders
coming from the informed and the uninformed traders. This approach is
similar to that of Dow and Gorton (1997) where market makers observe
orders stemming from the informed and uninformed hedgers. This structure
is different from Glosten and Milgrom (1985) because the informed and the
uninformed traders are simultaneously present in the market.6
5One could modify the structure of the model considering that the banks could transmit
non anonymous orders. In this case we could assume that the banks transmit non infor-
mative orders (brokerage) wli and informative orders wi (Germain and Vanhems (2003)
study this type of microstructure in an another context). This would lead to the same
type of result.
6It can be shown that qualitatively similar results are obtained in the Glosten and
Milgrom (1985) set-up when the informed trader and the liquidity trader are not simul-
taneously present in the market.
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2.2. Equilibrium without sales of information
2.2.1. Pure strategies equilibrium
We analyze Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. In equilibrium, given the
rational beliefs of the market makers, and the corresponding price function,
each insider chooses Xj to maximize his expected profits:
Xj(v) ∈ ArgmaxxjE[(v˜ − P (ω1, ω2, ..., ωN , ωl))xj |v].
To avoid being spotted, the insider chooses Xj(v) in (L, 0,−L). The choice
is straightforward: in state u he buys L, and sells −L in state d. Because
there are more than two informed agents, market makers observe either
(L,L, ..., L), (L,L, ..., 0) or (L, ..., L,−L) in state u, and (−L,−L, ...,−L,L),
(−L,−L, ..., 0) or (−L,−L, ...,−L,−L) in state d. Therefore, the price is
u = v¯ + ε in state u and d = v¯ − ε in state d. The expected profit of each
informed agent is 0 because market makers can always infer the presence of
an informed trader in the market. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs, which support
this equilibrium, are that market makers quote u if they observe a positive
order different from L and d if they observe a negative order different from
−L. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 There is no Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with pure strate-
gies in the game with costly collection of information and with at least two
traders who collect information and trade in the financial market.
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This proposition asserts that it is not worth collecting costly informa-
tion. This result is similar to the one obtained by Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980), except for the fact that, in this case, traders are not competitive
but strategic, as in Kyle (1985). This leads to the Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) paradox: if information is costly, prices are no longer informative be-
cause no informed trader wishes to trade.7 We show that the introduction
of contracts can circumvent this paradox.
2.2.2. Adding noise and collaboration
How can the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) paradox be overcome ?
One natural way to do it would be to increase the level of noise in the
market. However, because the level of noise is exogenous and constant, this
is not feasible. Another way would be for the informed j to trade randomly
and commit ex ante to a certain strategy. More precisely, in state u with
probability αj(N) the N insiders trade 0 and with probability 1 − αj(N),
they trade L (it is symmetric in state d). In doing so, the insiders mimic
the noise traders and add noise into prices. We mention this case only
to highlight the benefits derived from adding noise. It is not plausible in
practice that a large informed trader can commit to add noise. As Laffont
and Maskin (1991) point out:
”...it is difficult to see how the large trader can commit himself
7In this model, because the number of liquidity traders is constant and equal to one,
there is not enough noise to hide the informed demand and make profits. A constant
number of liquidity traders is equivalent to a constant amount of exogenous noise.
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to a pricing strategy beforehand. To begin with there is no ”be-
forehand.” Often, a trader is in the market only because he has
acquired private information. Before obtaining this information,
he may not foresee his participation and so cannot contemplate
what his strategy will be.”
The following proposition shows that without any coordination it is not
optimal to add noise.
Proposition 2 If the informed traders j = 1, 2, ..., N could commit to a
trading strategy αj(N) to play 0 with probability αj(N) in the states u and
d, and L (or −L) with probability 1 − αj(N) > 0 in state u (or d). At the
equilibrium, they would set:
αj(N) = 0.
If the informed trader could commit ex ante to a symmetric trading strat-
egy where αj(N) = α(N) the aggregated expected profit is:
NE(πj) = 1/3α(N)
N−1(1− α(N))4α(N) +N(1− α(N))
N(1 − α(N)) + 2α(N)Lε
each of the N informed traders plays α∗(N), the unique solution in [0, 1] of
the following cubic equation:
α3(−n3 + 3n2 + n− 3) + α2(3n3 − 4n2 − 5n− 6) +
α(−3n3−n2+3n+1)+(n3+2n2+n) = 0 (1)
where n = N − 1.
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In the presence of competition, informed traders never wish to randomize
their trades. So, it is not optimal to add noise. Indeed, if any trader
plays 0 the others would free ride in the noise added by the randomization.
Again, we face the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) paradox because prices
fully reveal the private information of the two traders. The result of this
proposition contrasts with Biais and Germain (2002) where ex ante the
monopolist informed trader wishes to add noise ; there exists an α∗ > 0 that
maximizes the expected profit of the monopolistic trader. This is due to the
competition effect which drives the competitors to play the pure strategy
of choosing L with probability 1.8 Nevertheless, in the next proposition,
we show that each trader would be better off if traders could collaborate.
As in a prisonner’s dilemma, the best outcome would be the collaborative
one. In that case, we would have an implicit collusion or complicity between
financial institutions which would maximize the joint profit of the banking
industry. Assuming that the firms are symmetric and enter the market, we
derive the optimal symmetric randomization strategy for each of them.
When informed traders could commit ex ante to a trading strategy, play-
ing 0 involves camouflage because market makers do not know if the null
trade stems from an informed or a noise trader. Thus, they create an en-
dogenous noise effect which can be measured by the probability to play 0,
which is the probability to mimic liquidity trades and to strategically de-
crease the reaction to the private information. Moreover, this manipulation
8Playing 0 with probability 1, which is equivalent to not entering the market is an
equilibrium too.
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is costless and the noise added is the maximum camouflage for the oligopoly
in the financial market. 9 As a consequence, if the traders were able to
collaborate by commiting to this costless noisy strategy, then it would be
optimal for them to play α∗, which maximizes the profit of the coalition.
But even if they could collaborate, it is not ex post optimal to play 0. This
mixed strategy is not an equilibrium because: i) informed traders are not
indifferent between playing 0 or L in state u, or playing 0 or −L in state d;
and ii) there is no credible commitment. The only way to give rise to op-
timal mixed strategy and to credible commitment is to introduce contracts
for the sale of information. In the presence of competition, we will show
that the banks can use public contracts signed with their clients to commit
to a certain strategy.
2.3. Sale of information
2.3.1. The contract
Now we consider the possibility of selling information. There are N
sellers of information who manage N different funds. Each client delegates
his money to a manager. Each fund manager makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer and afterwards receives a perfect information. The trading information
collected by the fund managers is short-lived, so renegotiation of the contract
9Biais and Germain (2002) show that it is never optimal to trade −L in state u because
this way of adding noise is costly. The trader playing in u as if he were in d gives him
good prices but this manoeuvre is too costly.
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after having received the information is physically impossible.10 Moreover,
the contracts are public, so each competitor can observe his competitor’s
contract at zero cost. In the model, all the banks are symmetric: i) their
ability to collect information is the same ii) they have access to clients who
go randomly to fund managers.11
There are N informed sellers of information. The contract specifies: i)
the trading volume of each fund j, yj, authorized by the client on the risky
asset; and ii) the compensation of the seller of information, t(πfj ), contingent
on fund’s profits where πfj are each j fund’s profits and t(. ) the function
which maps the profits of the funds into transfers. Each client receives:
πfj − t(πfj )
and the individual rationality condition of the client is:
E(πfj − t(πfj )) = k (2)
In this model we suppose that the client accepts the offer if it gives rise
to expected net profits greater than his (known) reservation level k. As in
Biais and Germain (2002), k can be interpreted as reflecting the bargaining
power of the customer in her negotiation with the informed agent.
10Nevertheless, Caillaud Jullien and Picard (1995) and Dewatripont (1988) show pre-
commitment effects with public contracts even in the case of a secret renegotiation.
11Note that in this model, all the managers have the same ability to collect perfect
information. Moreover, there are no reputation effects. See Benabou and Laroque (1992)
for a reputation-building model.
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2.3.2. The trading game
We consider now that fund managers trade also for their own ac-
count (proprietary trading) and transmit to risk neutral competitive market-
makers the sum of their own orders Xj and those on behalf of their clients
Yj equal to ωj:
(ω1, ω2, ..., ωN ) = (X1 + Y1,X2 + Y2, ...,XN + YN )
As we know from Proposition 2, the strategies are symmetric, and it is
optimal to play 0 with probability α∗(N), and L with probability 1−α∗(N)
in state u, they play 0 with probability α∗(N) and −L with probability
1− α∗(N) in state d.
Market makers observe the order flow ω = (ω1, ω2, ..., ωN , ωl), where ωl is
the volume transmitted by the noise traders and equal to L with probability
1
3 , 0 with probability
1
3 and −L with probability 13 . Orders are anonymous.
Market makers quote:
P = E(v˜|ω).
The profits of the funds are:
πfj = Yj(v˜ − P ) for j = 1, 2, ..., N.
The profits of the proprietary trading activities are:
πij = Xj(v˜ − P ) for j = 1, 2, ..., N.
13
2.3.3. Equilibrium strategy
Anonymity of orders guarantees that market makers do not know who is
trading. In order to avoid being discovered by the market makers, financial
institutions j send orders L = Xj + Yj or 0 = Xj + Yj in state u.
Therefore, each bank j follows the strategy (αj1, α
j
2) to randomize its
trades, where:
• αj1 is the probability that the informed in state u buys Yj = yj for the
fund and Xj = L− yj for his own account.
• αj2, is the probability that the informed trader buys Yj = −yj for the
fund and Xj = yj for his own account.
• (1 − αj1 − αj2) is the probability that the informed buys Yj = −yj for
the fund and Xj = L+ yj for his own account.
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2.3.4. The optimal contract
The financial institutions can adopt a collaborative behavior and offer
the contract which maximizes the profit of the coalition of the banks. There
are multiple equilibria and we focus on the symmetric case, which gives
12In Biais and Germain (2002), the banker can report any trade for the client ex post.
Without loss of generality, we consider here, as is usually the case in practice, that the
bank account of the client is separated from the bank account of the proprietary trading.
Therefore, there is no problem of misreporting and no need to consider ex post deviations
as the profits or the losses of the client are deduced from what is actually traded.
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rise to the optimal α∗(N) = α∗2. In this subsection we derive the optimal
symmetric contract:
∀ j = 1, 2, ..., N we have,
Xj = X, Yj = Y, π
f
j = π
f , πij = π
i and (αj1, α
j
2) = (α1, α2).
The expected profits of the client are:
E(πf ) = k +E(t(πf )). (3)
The seller’s expected profit is:
E(πi + t(πf )). (4)
Substituting (2.3) in (2.4), the seller’s expected profit is:
E(πi + πf )− k.
The program maximized by each of the N coalitions of informed traders
and their clients is (where −j characterizes the strategies of all agents but
j):
Maxt(.)E((Xj + Yj)(v˜ − P (Xj + Yj ,X−j + Y−j, ωl)) (5)
with
(Xj , Yj) ∈ ArgmaxXj ,YjE(Xj(v˜−P (Xj+Yj,X−j+Y−j, ωl)+t(πfj )|v) (6)
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subject to:
E(πf − t(πf )) = k. (7)
This program seeks a compensation function t(.) for the information
seller (bank) that maximizes the total profit of the coalition (client and
fund management), as expressed in (5), subject to the incentive compat-
ibility constraint (6) that the bank will choose (Xj , Yj) to maximize the
expected profit from proprietary trading, and the client’s individual ratio-
nality (participation) constraint (7). Xj represents the quantity traded by
the fund manager on behalf of the client and Yj represents the quantity
traded by the bank, and X−j and Y−j represent all the quantities traded by
all the funds and the banks except the fund j and the bank j.
The optimal contract gives the set of transfers t(.) which make the fund
manager indifferent between the different states of the world. The contract
specifies: i) a set of transfers t(.) from the funds to the banks and, ii) y
the quantity traded on behalf of the clients. Moreover, the optimal contract
gives rise to the optimal level of noise for the duopoly:
α∗2(N).
The profits of this game are presented in the following Table.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE.
Proposition 3 The optimal contract is characterized by a set of transfers
t1, t2, t3 which make the fund manager indifferent to trade in the following
three states:
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• buying y for the fund and L− y for proprietary trading,
• buying −y for the fund and y for proprietary trading,
• buying −y for the fund and L+ y for proprietary trading.
The quantity y traded on behalf on the clients is:
y =
Lα∗2((3− n)α∗2 + n+ 1)
(α22(n
2 − 6n+ n) + α∗2(−2n2 + 4n+ 2) + n2 + n)
The transfers are defined as follows:
∀ πf ≤ 0, t(πf ) = −t1 ≤ 0
If πf = yε
2α∗2
2α∗2 + (n+ 1)(1 − α∗2)
then t(πf ) = t2
If πf ≥ yε then t(πjf ) = t3
The optimal contract can be implemented by the following appropriate
option: selling K bullish vertical spreads where K is the number of options
necessary to get the points (0, t1) and (0, t2) aligned.
• The fund manager buys a call option with a zero exercise price and a
premium equal to t1 (paid by the informed to the client when the fund’s
profit are received).
• The fund manager sells a call with an exercise price equal to
2α∗2yε
N(1− α∗2) + 2α∗2
and a premium equal to zero.
This proposition shows that it is possible to derive optimal incentive-
compatible contracts for the sale of information in the presence of compe-
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tition. The optimal contract is a function of the number of sellers of infor-
mation. Like in a prisoner’s dilemma, without collaboration (in this model
commitment), the competitors would make zero profits. Being able to col-
laborate by proposing fund management contracts to their clients, financial
institutions can make profits. In the prisoner’s dilemma, there is no way for
the two prisoners to collaborate because of the competition between them
and the divergence between the individual interest and the collective one. In
this model, the banks face the same dilemma. However, they can commit ex
ante to another strategy through their fund management activities. More-
over, this circumvents the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) paradox because
the traders can create some additional noise to recover the cost of collecting
information. The features of this optimal contract are the following:
• For negative profits of the fund, the manager is not punished too much,
which creates incentives to fund managers to add the optimal level of
noise.
• For profits in the range [0,yε 2α
∗
2
2α∗2 + (n+ 1)(1− α∗2)
], the fund man-
ager’s compensation increases with the profits of the fund. This gives
incentives to the fund manager to reveal his private information to his
client.
• For higher profits, the fund manager’s remuneration remains constant
in order to take into account a limited liability constraint (the manager
can not take more money from the fund than the fund’s profits).
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It is worth noting that linear contracts are not optimal in this setting.13
Moreover, there is an infinite number of incentive compatible contracts – we
focus on this one because it is easy to implement in practice.
In this model we assume that the financial institution can bundle its
proprietary trades with the trades for its clients. This netting is legal in
the NYSE (see NYSE rule 390 and SEC Rule 19c 3) and customary on the
NASDAQ 14).
3. The case where information is costless
The following proposition defines the characteristics of the market, where
a large number of financial intermediaries collect information at zero cost.
Proposition 4 When the number of financial intermediaries N increases,
the optimal amount of endogenous strategic noise α∗(N) strictly increases
(see Fig. 1) and goes to unity. The aggregate profit NE(πi + πf )(α∗(N))
13Indeed, in Biais and Germain (2002), the bank account of the fund management and
the proprietary trading activities are not separated. As a consequence, there is a problem
of misreporting the client’s trade ex post, which creates additional constraints and leads
to an optimal linear contract. Of course, we can show that optimal contracts are also
linear in the case where the banker could report ex post any trade.
14However, if the Chinese walls in those financial institutions are too thick, say because
the trades of both parts of the banks cannot be coordinated, we can show that the model
is still robust. Indeed, in that case, to give rise to the optimal trading strategy of trading
0 with probability α∗(N), the financial institution just sets up a fund (indirect sale of
information) and draws up a contract stipulating that the manager of the fund can commit
not to trade with probability α∗(N).
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decreases with N (see Fig. 2) 15 and is equal at the limit to:
1
3
4 + c
2 + c
e−cLε > 0
where c is a constant defined in the proof.
FIGURE 1 AND 2 GO HERE.
The interpretation of this proposition is as follows. When a very large
number of sellers of information enter the market they can endogenize the
amount of noise in such a way that they still not reveal their private informa-
tion. This suggests that fund management activities create an endogenous
noise on top of the noise stemming from the liquidity trades. Usually, as in
Kyle (1984) and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), the informativeness of prices
is an increasing function of the number of informed traders, which implies
that the aggregate profit is decreasing. 16 In this model, the agregate profit
is slightly decreasing (see Fig. 2).17
In an oligopoly a` la Cournot, like in Kyle (1984) or Admati and Pflei-
derer (1988), the aggregate profit is decreasing and always smaller than the
monopolistic trader’s profit. This result holds in this model too. But in
the limit, contrary to Kyle (1984) or Admati and Pfleiderer (1988), the ag-
gregate profit is not going to zero and prices do not reveal all the private
15In all the figures ε = L = 1.
16In those two models, in the limit, the aggregate profit goes to 0 and prices are fully
revealing.
17In Fig. 2, we see clearly that the aggregate profit is decreasing very slowly to become
almost constant. This highlights the fact that the informativeness of prices reaches a limit
very fast.
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information. Indeed, in the limit, the competition effect and the commit-
ment effect have the same magnitude. Even with an infinite number of
sellers of information, the financial market is not efficient.
In the following lemma we characterize the optimal contract in the limit.
Lemma 1 If the number of sellers of information goes to infinity, the opti-
mal contract goes to:
y∞ =
4+c
c2+6c+2
L (see F ig. 3)
t1∞ = k + y∞
1
3e
−c c
2 + 7c+ 6
c+ 2
(see F ig. 4)
t2∞ = t3∞ = y∞ − t1∞ (see F ig. 5)
where c is the real solution of the following cubic equation:
c3 + 5c2 + 4c− 8 = 0.
FIGURE 3 AND 4 AND 5 GO HERE.
In fact, the more informed sellers there are, the larger are the quantities
traded on behalf of their clients as well as the transfers to the fund managers.
4. The case where information is costly
When information is costly, informed traders do not enter the market
freely, but pay C to observe u or d. They do so if and only if the benefits
of being an informed trader selling his information are at least equal to the
cost of being informed. Hence, there is an equilibrium number of sellers
of information corresponding to the case where the equality holds. The
21
following proposition characterizes the number of sellers at the equilibrium.
Proposition 5 If C is the information cost then there is only one number
N∗ of sellers such that:
3
C
L
= αN
∗−1(1−α)4α +N(1− α)
N(1 − α) + 2αLε (8)
See Fig. 2 for the monotonicity of the aggregate profit.
The cheaper the information, the more prices are informative and the
more people collect information. With costly collection of information, there
is a finite number of sellers of information who can enter the market and
prices partially reveal their private information.
5. Robustness
5.1. Robustness to assumptions on the distribution of liquid-
ity trades
One might question to what extent our results reflect the highly stylized
nature of our assumptions regarding the distribution of the liquidity trades.
The economic point we want to make, and which we believe is robust to vari-
ations in the parametric assumptions, is the following: commitment enables
the informed trader to reduce the aggressiveness of his trades, and thus to
increase his trading profits by reducing information revelation. Randomiza-
tion in the trading strategy of the informed agent is a way to thus reduce
the aggressiveness of his trades.
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To shed some light on this issue, we now consider a generalization of our
model whereby the liquidity trades can take, with equal probability, one of
the following five values: {−2L,−L, 0, L, 2L}. In this slightly more general
context, we show that it is indeed still the case that commitment enables
informed traders to enhance their profits by reducing their responsiveness
to their signals. Moreover, we show that the optimal contract is such that
the quantity y traded on behalf of the client depends on the structure of the
liquidity trading and can take different values.
Lemma 2 Consider the case where there are N informed agents and one
liquidity trader sending their orders to the market makers. If the informed
agents can commit to a trading strategy, then in state u it is optimal for
them to give a positive probability to the three non–negative trades: 0, L and
2L. Moreover, there exists, as in the previous case, an optimal incentive
compatible contract where y0 is the quantity traded by the fund when the
bank transmits an order of the size 0, y1 is the quantity traded by the fund
when the bank transmits an order of the size L, and y2 is the quantity traded
by the fund when the bank transmits an order of the size 2L. The optimal
contract can be implemented by selling K bullish vertical spreads also.
It is worth noting that in a continuous framework, more complex con-
tracts would have to be designed and there would be a continuum of possible
trades: [−y, y] where −y and +y can be interpreted as the maximum risky
positions that the fund manager is allowed to take. Such bounds are actually
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observed in practice. However, this proposition shows that we can obtain
more complex and realistic contracts with a richer set of liquidity trades.
5.2. Generalization of the structure of information
We have maintained the assumption that an informed trader is always
informed before trading. In this subsection, we relax this assumption by
assuming that the informed trader receives a perfect signal with probability
π and has no information with the complementary probability.
First of all, we show that above a certain probability π∗ it is always
optimal to add some noise in the market:
Lemma 3 Let α∗(N) be the former value computed for a game with per-
fect information and which maximizes the profits of the coalition. Let π be
the probability for an informed agent to be informed and α∗∗(N) the new
probability which maximizes the expected profits:
• for π > 1 − α∗(N), there exists an α∗∗(N) in (0,1) (mixed strategy)
which maximizes the profits of the coalition.
• for π < 1− α∗(N), α∗∗(N) = 1.
This lemma shows that for π large enough it is still optimal to commit
to add noise as in Proposition 2.
Now let us consider the possibility for informed traders to sell their
information. Following the same methodology used in the previous case, it
can be shown that there exists optimal contracts allowing the possibility to
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play 0 in the case in which there is no information.
Lemma 4 The optimal contracts are formally the same as the ones described
in the case of perfect information.
6. Conclusion
We have addressed the broad question of competition between informed
financial institutions and shown that public contracts permit banks to com-
mit to trade less aggressively and recover part of their cost of collection of
information. In fact, optimal contracts: i) give rise to optimal mixed strate-
gies and ii) are public, which makes credible the competitors’ commitment.
Those contracts are incentive compatible because: i) they allow the banks to
generate the optimal level of noise for the banking industry and ii) they re-
spect the individual rationality constraint of the clients. Optimal contracts
restore Pareto optimality. In particular, competitors can enter the market
with costly information and partially reveal their private information which
avoids the Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) paradox.
There are very few empirical studies investigating the impact of fund
management activities on stock prices. It would be interesting, for exam-
ple, to test the informational content of fund management trades versus
the informational content of proprietary trading activities. One empiri-
cal prediction of this model is that proprietary trading activities are more
profitable than fund management activities. Declerck (2003) shows that
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expected profits of proprietary trading activities are higher than expected
profits of agents’orders (fund management activities and retail custumers).
Moreover, she shows that proprietary trading orders obtain better execution
and are more aggressive. It would be also interesting to try to disentangle
the orders stemming from fund managers from those coming from retail or-
ders to measure their informational content and test part of the empirical
implications of our model. Another empirical prediction is that the level
of noise observed in prices is in part stemming from fund management ac-
tivities and also that an increase in the bank competition level does not
diminish the level of noise in the prices.
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Table 1
Profits in state u if N sellers of information play the strategy α1, α2
Y i X i ω
−N L Profits
y L− y if L ∈ ω
−j L, 0,−L 0
y L− y ω
−j = (0, ...0) L 0
y L− y ω
−j = (0, ...0) 0
2α2
N(1−α2)+2α2
ε
y L− y ω
−j = (0, ..., 0) −L ε
−y y ifL ∈ ω
−j L 0
−y y if (L, L) ∈ ω
−j 0,−L 0
−y y ω
−j = (L, 0, ...0) L 0
−y y ω
−j = (L, 0...0) 0
2α2
N(1−α2)+2α2
ε
−y y ω
−j = (L, 0..., 0) −L ε
−y y ω
−j = (0, ..., 0) L
2α2
N(1−α2)+2α2
ε
−y y ω
−j = (0, ..., 0) 0 ε
−y y ω
−j = (0, ..., 0) −L
2N(1−α2)+2α2
N(1−α2)+2α2
ε
−y L + y L ∈ ω
−j L, 0 0
−y L + y (L,L) ∈ ω
−j −L 0
−y L + y (0, ..., 0) = ω
−j L 0
−y L + y (0, ..., 0) = ω
−j 0
2α2
N(1−α2)+2α2
ε
−y L + y (0, ..., 0) = ω
−j −L
2N(1−α2)+2α2
N(1−α2)+2α2
ε
Note. Profits of the sellers of information. The tables gives the profits of N banks
in state u when they play y for the fund and L − y for their own account with
probability α1, −y for the fund and y for their own account with probability α2
and −y for the fund and L+ y for their own account with probability 1−α1 − α2.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 and 2
N informed sellers j = (1, ..., N) transmit an order of size 0 with prob-
ability αj(N) and of size L with probability 1 − αj(N). Probablities are
computed by market makers using Bayes’ rule. Market makers observe the
anonymous volumes ω = (ω1, ω2, ..., ωN , ωl) where ωl is L, 0 or -L with prob-
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ability (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Conditional probabilities for each observed volume
in state u are:
p(u|L,L, ...) = 1
p(u|L, 0, ..., 0) =
1 +
N∑
i=1
(1− αi)
αi
2 +
N∑
i=1
(1− αi)
αi
p(u| − L, 0..., 0) = 1− p(u|L, 0, ..., 0)
p(u|0, ...0) = 12
p(u|L,−L, 0, ..., 0) = 12
Probabilities in state d are straightforward as p(u|ω) + p(d|ω) = 1. The
profits of the informed j is:
(u− d)(1 − p(u|ωj , ω−j, ωl))
where ω−j characterizes all the volumes transmitted by the traders ex-
cept for the jth informed. Let αi(N) = αi. The expected profit of each
agent is:
πi(α) = 1/3(1 − αi)[ Π
j =i
αj](3−
2([ Π
j =i
αj ] +
N∑
j=1
(1− αj)[ Π
j =i
αj ])
2[ Π
j =i
αj ] +
N∑
j=1
(1− αj)[ Π
j =i
αj ]
)εL.
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This is equivalent to:
πi(α) = 1/3(1 − αi)[ Π
j =i
αj](
4 +
N∑
j=1
1− αj
αj
2 +
N∑
j=1
(1−αj)
αj
)εL.
Indeed, the ith agent makes profits when he plays L with probability
1 − αj and the other agents play 0 with probability αj . In that case the
profits are (u − d)p(u|ω) i.e (2ε)[1/3](0 + 1 + [1 − p(u|L, 0, ...0)]) where 0
1/3 and 1/3(1− p(u|L, 0, ...0)) are the expected profits for each state of the
world.
We consider the one-to-one change in variable:
(0, 1) → (0,∞)
αi → βi = 1− αi
αi
Define β = (β1, β2, ..., βN )
′
.
πi(β) = 1/3βi
N
Π
j=1
1
1 + βj
4 +
N∑
j=1
βj
2 +
N∑
j=1
βj
The program of each agent is now equivalent to maximizing the trading
profit:
maxβiπi(β),
which is equivalent to:
30
Max ln(πi(β)) = −ln3+lnβi−
N∑
j=1
ln(1+βj)+ln(4+
N∑
j=1
βj)−ln(2+
N∑
j=1
βj).
The first-order condition (FOC) associated with the ith agent program
is ∀i = 1, ..., N :
1
βi
− 1
1 + βi
+
1
4 +
N∑
j=1
βj
− 1
2 +
N∑
j=1
βj
= 0.
This is equivalent for i = j to:
βi(1 + βi) = βj(1 + βj).
This implies either ∀i = 1, ..., N βi = βj or βi + βj + 1 = 0. But this
is impossible since βi > 0.
Let β∗ be this common value. We have:
2β∗(1 + β∗) = (2 +Nβ∗)(4 +Nβ∗).
The βs solutions of the former equation are:
β1 =
−(3N − 1)−
√
(N2 − 6N + 17)
N2 − 2 ,
β2 =
−(3N − 1) +
√
(N2 − 6N + 17)
N2 − 2 .
If we look at the condition under which β∗ > 0, we have the condition
√
N2 − 6N + 17 > 3N − 1, which implies that N < 1. Therefore, there is
no local extremum in the interior.
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Hence, πi(αi) = 0 for αi = 1 or αi = 0. This proves that the maximum
profit is 0 and reached either for αi = 0 or αi = 1. Therefore, it is not
optimal to add noise for two or more traders engaged in Nash competition.
Moreover, if information is costly, they cannot recover the cost of collection
of information.
Maximizing the aggregate profit without imposing the constraint that
each agent participate obviously leads to the monopolistic trader case. We
turn to the following program, where the N traders collaborate and maximize
their joint profit:
Maxβ
∑
i=1
Nπi(β)
with β = b(1, 1, ..., 1)′ .
MaxβN/3b(
1
1 + b
)N
4 +Nb
2 +Nb
The FOC is:
N2(N − 1)b3 + b2N(5N − 4) + 4b(N − 2)− 8 = 0.
We will now show the existence for b > 0 of a maximum α ∈ [0, 1].
Define g(N, b) = N2(N − 1)b3 + N(5N − 4)b2 + 4b(N − 2) − 8 then,
g(N, 0) = −8 < 0, and lim
b→∞
g =∞ (for N > 1).
Since g is continuous, there exists a solution to the equation g(N, b) = 0
such that for b > 0, there exists a α ∈ (0, 1) which maximizes:
Max
N∑
i=1
πi(α)
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s.t α = α(1, ..., 1)′
The uniqueness follows from:
dG
dB
= 3N2(N − 1)b2 + 2N(5N − 4)b+ 4(N − 2).
Because 3N2(N − 1)b2 + 2N(5N − 4)b+ 4(N − 2) = 0 has two negative
roots for N ≥ 2, the sign of dg/db > 0, ∀b > 0.
This proves the uniqueness for N ≥ 2.
Expressing the probabilities and expected profit when the traders max-
imize the profit of the coalition as a function of N and α(N) leads to:
p(u|L,L, ...) = 1
p(u|L, 0, ..., 0) = N(1− α) + α(N)
N(1− α(N)) + 2α(N)
p(u| − L, 0, ..., 0) = α(N)
N(1− α(N)) + 2α(N)
p(u|0, ...0) = 12
p(u|L,−L, 0, ..., 0) = 12
The expected profit of the informed j is:
(u− d)(1 − p(u|ωj , ω−j, ωl))
where ω−j are the quantities transmitted by informed traders except j.
It is equal to:
(u− d)(1 − p(u|ωj, ω−j , ωl)) = 1
3
αN−1(1− α)4α +N(1− α)
N(1 − α) + 2αεL.
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Expressing the FOC with n = N − 1 leads to:
α3(−n3+3n2+n−3)+α2(3n3−4n2−5n−6)+α(−3n3−n2+3n+1)+n3+2n2+n = 0.
We have proved that this equation admits only one real solution in [0,1]
which is a maximum.
QED
Proof of Proposition 3
Incentive Compatibility Condition of the informed agent
To randomize the informed has to be indifferent between:
• buying y for the fund and L− y for proprietary trading,
• buying −y for the fund and y for proprietary trading,
• buying −y for the fund and L+ y for proprietary trading.
Expected profits in these three cases are:
Eπi0 =
1
3
αn2
α2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1(L− y)ε+
1
3
αn2 (t2 + t3 + 2t1)− t1 (A.1)
Eπi1 =
1
3
[n(1− α2)αn−12
α2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1 + α
n
2 ]εy − t1 (A.2)
Eπi2 =
1
3
αn2
α2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1ε(y + L)− t1 (A.3)
(A.2) = (A.3)⇔ y = L α2(α2(3− n) + n+ 1)
α22(n
2 − 5n) + α2(2 + 4n− 2n2) + n+ n2
(A.4)
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(A.1) = (A.3)⇔ t2 + t3 + 2t1 = 2y(α2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1)εL (A.5)
Individual rationality condition of the buyer:
α1[
1
3
αn2 (
α2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1)yε+ t1 −
1
3
αn2 (t2 + t3 + 2t1)]
−α2[(1
3
(
α2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1n(1− α2α
n−1
2 + α
n
2 )yε− t1]
−(1− α1 − α2)[1
3
αn2 (
α2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1)yε− t1] = k (A.6)
Note that k can’t be arbitrarily large because the expected profit of an
agent is positive. Thus, k must have an upper bound. In fact, the agent and
the client have to share their common profits in the coalition. Therefore,
the maximum value of k decreases rapidly to zero with 1
N
when N goes to
infinity (see Proposition 4).
Substituting (A.4) and (A.5) in (A.6) we have:
t1 = k +
−13yε
α2(1− n) + n+ 1α
∗n
2 [α
2
2((3− n)(1 + n)−
3(1 − n)) + α2(n+ 1)(2n − 5)− (1 + n)2] (A.7)
Equations (A.4), (A.5) and (A.7) define the optimal contract for all N .
α2 = α
∗(N) is the solution of equation (1) which gives the optimal level of
noise for a given number of banks.
We now argue that the optimal contract is stable. If the agents observe
that a certain competitor is not engaged in fund management activities, they
retaliate by not signing a contract either. In this case the expected profit
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of the all agents is zero. Therefore, there are no incentives to be out of the
coalition. In fact, the presence of public contracts allows the competitors to
check any deviations.
The Bullish Vertical Spread
To characterize the bullish vertical spread we substitute t2 = t3 in (A.5):
t1 + t2 = y
α2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1 (A.8)
Substituting (A.7) in (A.8) one finds t2.
Let K be the scope of the line for the points (0,−t1), (y(u−P (L, 0, ..., 0)), t2)
to be aligned:
t2 + t1 = K(
2α2yε
(n+ 1)(1 − α2) + 2α2 ) (A.9)
Substituting (A.8) in (A.9) one finds that:
K =
yα2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1
2α2yε
(n+ 1)(1− α2) + 2α2
(A.10)
K is the number of options to be sold and bought by the fund manager.
(y(u − P (L, 0, ..., 0)) = 2α2y
(n+ 1)(1 − α2) + 2α2 ε is the exercise price of the
option.
The optimal contract
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For each α2 we define a contract which makes the banker indifferent
between playing 0 and L in state u or 0 and −L in state d. To get the
contract optimal, we showed in Proposition 2 that it is sufficient to replace
α2 by α
∗
2 in the above equations.
QED
Proof of Proposition 4
We first compute an equivalent of α∗(n) when n goes to ∞.
Since α(n) is solution of the cubic equation (1), we expand α∗(n) in the
following polynomial form in 1
n
:
α∗(n) = 1− c
nδ
+ o(
1
nδ
)
where c is a positive real number and δ an integer.
Plugging this form into (1) we obtain:
c3
n3δ
+ o(
1
n3δ
) + 5
c2
n2δ+1
+ o(
1
n2δ+1
) + 4
c
nδ+2
+ o(
1
nδ+2
)− 8
n3
+ o(
1
nδ+2
) = 0.
This implies δ = 1, and
c3 + 5c2 + 4c− 8 = 0,
which admits a unique solution in [0, 1]. Indeed, it is easy to show that if
δ = 1, then the equality cannot hold. With no loss of generality, let suppose
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that δ < 1. Multiplying the left-hand and the right-hand sides by n3, we
have:
c3 + εn = 0
where lim
n→∞
εn = 0. This implies that c = 0, which is impossible.
Moreover (1) ⇔
(−α∗33 + 3α∗22− 3α∗ + 1) + 1
n
(3α∗3 − 4α∗2 − α∗ + 2) +
1
n2
(α∗33− 5α∗2 + 3α∗ + 1) + α∗ 1
n3
(−3α∗2 − 6α∗ + 1) = 0
⇔
Pn(α
∗) = (1− α∗)3 + (1− α
∗)2
n
(3α∗ + 2) +
(α∗ − 1)
n2
(α∗2 − 4α∗ − 1) + α
∗
n3(−3α∗2 − 6α∗ + 1) = 0
Because α is in [0, 1], when n → ∞ one shows that Pn(α) → (1 − α)3,
and so α→ 1.
To obtain the limit of the aggregated profit, substitute α∗(n) by α∗(n) =
1− c
n
+ o( 1
n2
) in the aggregate profit, which is equal to:
1
3
Nα∗(N)N−1(1− α∗(N))4α
∗(N) +N(1− α∗(N))
N(1 − α∗(N)) + 2α∗(N)Lε.
We find the limit of the expected profit:
1
3
c
4 + c
2 + c
[(1 − c
n
)n]Lε =
1
3
c
4 + c
2 + c
e−cLε
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because lim
n→∞
(1− c
n
)n = e−c.
The aggregate profit, a function of α∗, is a decreasing function of n. This
result is characterized graphically in Fig. 2. Consequently, the informative-
ness of prices increases and also goes to a finite limit.
QED
Proof of Lemma 1
Replacing α∗ by 1− c
n
+ o( 1
n2
) one finds y∞, t1∞ , t2∞ + t3∞. QED
Proof of Proposition 5
The aggregate profit is strictly decreasing with α∗(N), so there is only
one α∗ for a level of aggregate profit. Moreover, α∗(N) is strictly increasing
with N , so there is only one N∗ for one α∗. QED
Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the case where in state u the insider trades 0 with probability
α0, L with probability α1 and 2L with probability α2. In state d the in-
sider trades 0 with probability α0, −L with probability α1 and −2L with
probability α2. One can easily see that sales in state u or purchases in d are
not optimal. First we show that there exists (α∗1,α
∗
2) which maximizes the
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expected profits of the informed. In this context, the updated probabilities
for the market makers are the following:
p(u|2L, 0...0) = nα2 + α0
nα2 + 2α0
p(u|2L, 0... − L) = α2
α2 + α1
p(u|2L, 0... − 2L) = 1
2
p(u|L, 0...0) = nα1 + α0
nα1 + 2α0
p(u|L, 0... − L) = 1
2
p(u|L, 0... − 2L) = α1
α2 + α1
In state u, his expected profit if he trades 2L is:
E(π2) = 2ε(
2
5
αN0
Nα2 + 2α0
+
2
5
αN−10 α1
α1 + α2
+
1
5
αN−10 ).
While his expected profit from trading L is:
E(π1) = 2ε(
1
5
αN0
Nα1 + 2α0
+
1
5
αN−10 α2
α2 + α1
+
1
10
αN−10 ).
Therefore, his total expected profit is:
Eπ = (
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)n2ε 1− α1 − α2
2− 2α1 − 2α2 + (n+ 1)α2
+
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)n2ε α1
α1 + α2
+
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)nε)α22L
+(
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)n2ε 1− α1 − α2
2− 2α1 − 2α2 + (n+ 1)α1
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+
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)n2ε α2
α1 + α2
+
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)nε)Lα1
We define f such that:
f(x) =


0 for x = (0, 0)
Eπ for x ∈ ([01] × [01]) ∩ {(α1, α2)/α1 + α2 ≤ 1} − (0, 0)
This function of two variables (α1,α2) is defined on the compact:
([0, 1] × [0, 1]) ∩ {(α1, α2)/α1 + α2 ≤ 1}.
Eπ(.) is a continous function because it is a sum of rational functions
with denominators different from zero on its domain of definition. Moroever,
the limit of Eπ(.) when α1 and α2 go to zero is equal to zero. In conclusion, f
is continuous. Because the considered domain is a compact, applying Heine’s
theorem, f has got a maximum and it is reached on its domain. Two cases
are possible:
• α∗1, α∗2 are inside the domain,
• the maximum is reached on one of the frontiers.
We will prove that the second assertion is not possible. We will check the
cases α∗1 = 0 or α
∗
2 = 0. For α1 +α2 = 1 when N ≥ 2 the market maker will
immediatly deduce from the trades the true state of the world.
Let show that on the frontier α1 = 0 the maximum is not reached.
Note that f is a continuously differentiable function on the domain ([01]×
[01]) ∩ {(α1, α2)/α1 + α2 ≤ 1} − (0, 0). For a given α′2 on the considered
frontier we consider the mixed strategies (α1, α2) such that α1 + α2 = α
′
2.
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The differential of Eπ(.) in (0, α′2) along the line defined by the equation
α1 + α2 = α
′
2 is equal to:
1
5
ǫ(1−A)n(2( 2A
(2(1 −A) + (n+ 1)α2 +A)+
2α2(− 2(n+ 1)A∆(α2)
(2(1 −A) + (n+ 1)α2)2 +
2∆(α1)
A
)+
2A
2(1 +A)
+
2α2
A
+A
with A = (1− α1 − α2)n, with ∆(α1) > 0 and ∆(α2) < 0.
Note that all the terms are positive. Therefore, the differential is also
positive. We conclude that α1 = 0 is not a maximum.
The same proof on the frontier α2 = 0 leads to the same conclusion.
We conclude that the global maximum(s) of f is (are) reached inside the
domain, and therefore that the possible strategies maximizing the profits
are mixed strategies. Numerically it can be shown that this maximum is
unique (see Fig. 6).
FIGURE 6 GOES HERE
The optimal contract
Incentive Compatibility Condition of the informed agent
To randomize the informed has to be indifferent between:
• buy y2 for the fund and 2L− y2 for proprietary trading (with a prob-
ability α4).
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• buy −y2 for the fund and 2L + y2 for proprietary trading (with a
probability α2 − α4).
• buy y1 for the fund and L− y1 for proprietary trading (with a proba-
bility α3).
• buy −y1 for the fund and L+ y1 for proprietary trading (with a prob-
ability α1 − α3).
• buy −y3 for the fund and y3 for proprietary trading (with a probability
1− α2 − α1).
Expected profits in these cases are:
Eπi21 = (
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)n2ε 1− α1 − α2
2 − 2α1 − 2α2 + (n+ 1)α2 +
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)n2ε α1
α1 + α2
+
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)nε)(2L− y2) + 1
5
(1− α1 − α2)n(t22 + t32 + t42)
−t1(1− 3
5
(1− α1 − α2)n) (A.11)
Eπi22 = (
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)n2ε 1− α1 − α2
2 − 2α1 − 2α2 + (n+ 1)α2 +
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)n2ε α1
α1 + α2
+
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)nε)(2L+ y2)− t1 (A.12)
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Eπi0 = (n
1
5
(1− αT )(n−1)α22ε 1− αT
2(1 − αT ) + (n+ 1)α2 + n
1
5
(1− αT )(n−1)α22ε α1
α1 + α2
+
n
1
5
(1− αT )(n−1)α22ε+ n1
5
(1− αT )(n−1)α12ε 1− αT
2(1 − αT ) + (n+ 1)α∗1
+
n
1
5
(1− αT )(n−1)α∗12ε
α2
α∗1 + α2
+ n
1
5
(1− αT )(n−1)α12ε+
1
5
(1− αT )n (1− αT ) + (n+ 1)α1
2(1 − αT ) + (n+ 1)α1 +
1
5
(1− αT )n (1− αT ) + (n+ 1)α2
2(1− αT ) + (n+ 1)α2 +
1
5
(1− αnT ε)(y3)− t1 (A.13)
Eπi11 = (
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)n2ε 1− α1 − α2
2 − 2α1 − 2α2 + (n+ 1)α1 +
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)n2ε α2
α1 + α2
+
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)nε)(L− y1) + 1
5
(1− α1 − α2)n(t21 + t31 + t41)
−t1(1− 3
5
(1− α1 − α2)n (A.14)
Eπi12 = (
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)n2ε 1− α1 − α2
2 − 2α1 − 2α2 + (n+ 1)α1 +
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)n2ε α2
α1 + α2
+
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)nε)(L+ y1)− t1 (A.15)
The individual rationality of the client is given by the following equation:
α4(
2
5
((1− α1 − α2)nǫ(1− α1 − α2)
2− 2α1 − 2α2 + (n+ 1)α2 +
2
5
(1− α1 − α2)nǫα1
α1 + α2
+
1
5
(1−α1−α2)nǫ)y2
−1
5
(t24 + t23 + t24)(1− α1 − α2)n + t1(1− 3
5
(1− α1 − α2)n))+
(α2 − α4)(t1 − y2(2
5
(1− α1 − α2)nǫ(1− α1 − α2)
2− 2α1 − 2α2 + (n+ 1)α2 +
2
5
(1− α1 − α2)nǫα1
α1 + α2
44
+
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)nǫ))+
(α1 − α3)(t1 − y1(2
5
(1− α1 − α2)(n+1)ǫ
2− 2α1 − 2α2 + (n+ 1)α1 +
2
5
(1− α1 − α2)nǫα2
α1 + α2
+
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)nǫ))+
α3((
2
5
(1− α1 − α2)(n+1)ǫ
2− 2α1 − 2α2 + (n+ 1)α1 +
2
5
(1− α1 − α2)nǫα2
α1 + α2
+
1
5 (1−α1−α2)nǫ)y1− 15(t12+t13+t14)(1−α1−α2)n+t1(1− 35(1−α1−α2)n))
+(1 − α1 − α2)(t1 − y3ǫ((15n(1 − α1 − α2)(n−1)(α2 + α1) + 15 (1 − α1 −
α2)
n)+4
n(1− α1 − α2)(n−1)(α1)α2
α1 + α2
+
1
5
n(1− α1 − α2)(n−1)(α2 + α1)
+
2
5
n(1− α1 − α2)nα1
2(1 − α1 − α2) + (n+ 1)α1 +
1
5
(1− α1 − α2)n((1− α1 − α2) + (n+ 1)α2)
2(1 − α1 − α2) + (n+ 1)α2
+
1
5
((1− α1 − α2) + (n+ 1)α1)(1 − α1 − α2)n))
2(1 − α1 − α2) + (n+ 1)α1 = k
To define a bullish vertical spread we need only to fix two transfers as
the other are defined by the form of the contract. We have to find y1, y2, y3
as well the two transfers tij. We have five equations for five unknown values.
After cumbersome computations, we can find solutions with y1 = y2 = y3.
The following tables give numerical values for the optimal contract as a
function of n (computed with ǫ = 1 and L = 1):
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n α1 α2 y1 y2 y3
2 0.2 0.13 11.84 8.66 6.49
10 0.055 0.035 11.65 8.49 6.51
50 0.015 0.01 11.16 8.24 5.36
100 0.0075 0.005 11.12 8.2 5.39
500 0.002 0.002 -0.82 11.51 16.02
n α1 α2 tmin tmax K
2 0.2 0.13 -1.18 17.7 26.98
10 0.055 0.035 -2.09 17.88 26.88
50 0.015 0.01 -1.91 17.32 25.60
100 0.0075 0.005 -1.80 17.27 25.53
500 0.002 0.002 -0.82 11.51 16.02
The same form of the contract can be achieved in this case as well.
QED
Proof of Lemma 3
It is straightforward that the game with a probability of being informed
is stricly equivalent to the former one by replacing the probability α by the
probability 1 − π(1 − α). For a game with perfect information, we show
that there exists a single α∗ in (0, 1) such that the aggegate profits of the
coalition increase on (0, α∗) and decrease on (α∗, 1). Therefore, there are
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two cases depending on the value of π:
• for π > 1 − α∗ there exists α∗∗ in (0, 1) (mixed strategy) such that
α∗∗ = 1−π(1−α∗) and maximizes the expected profits of the coalition,
• for π < 1 − α∗ we have α∗ < 1 − π(1 − α) < 1. In a game with
perfect information, the aggregate profits decreases on (α∗, 1) with α.
Therefore 1 − π(1 − α) has to be the smallest possible (the closest
from α∗) to maximize the aggregate profits. As the function α →
1− π(1− α) increases on (0, 1), the expected profit is maximized for
α∗∗ = 0.
Note that in both cases this maximum is unique.
Proof of Lemma 4
With probability 1−π, the agents have no information. In this case, it is
straightforward that the informed will not send an aggregate order different
from zero. It is worth noticing that contracts where the banks do not trade
are not robust. Indeed, in this case banks could pretend not to be informed
and trade alone for their own account. Therefore, at the equilibrium banks
have to be indifferent between trading quantities a or -a.
In this case, as the banks have no information, they have to be indifferent
between buying y′ = a or selling −y′ = a for the fund buying y = −a or
selling −y = −a for their own account whatever the state of the world. As
a consequence we obtain the following system of equations:
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Eπi0 =
1
3
αn2
α2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1(L− y)ε+
1
3
αn2 (t2 + t3 + 2t1)− t1 (A.16)
Eπi1 =
1
3
[n(1− α2)αn−12
α2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1 + α
n
2 ]εy − t1 (A.17)
Eπ′i1 = −
1
3
[n(1− α2)αn−12
α∗2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1 + α
n
2 ]εy
′ +
1
3
(αn2 (t2 + 2t3) + n(1− α2)αn−12 (t2 + t3− t1)) (A.18)
Eπi2 =
1
3
αn2
α2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1ε(y + L)− t1. (A.19)
And the rationality condition of the buyer is:
α1[
1
3
αn2 (
α2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1)yε+ t1 −
1
3
αn2 (t2 + t3 + 2t1)]
−α2[1
2
(
1
3
(
α2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1n(1− α
∗
2)α
n−1
2 + α
n
2 )y
′ε− t1)
+
1
2
(−1
3
[n(1−α2)αn−12
α2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1+α
n
2 ]εy
′+
1
3
(αn2 (t2+2t3)+n(1−α2)αn−12 (t2+t3−t1)]
−(1−α1−α2)[1
3
αn2 (
α2(3− n) + n+ 1
α2(1− n) + n+ 1)yε−t1] = k (A.20)
After solving this system, we find that y = y′ with y defined by the
following equation:
y = y′ =
α2(−3α2 + α2n− n− 1)L
(2α22 − 3n(1− α2)α2 + n2(1− α2)α2 − n2(1− α2)− n(1− α2))
(A.21)
In conclusion, we obtain the same type of contract as the one computed
with perfect information.
QED
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Fig. 1. Probability of trade as a function of the number of informed traders.
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The figure shows α the probability to trade zero as a function of n = N − 1
where N is the number of informed traders.
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Fig. 2. Expected aggregate profit as a function of the number informed
traders.
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The figure shows the expected aggregate profit as a function of n = N − 1
where N is the number of informed traders and k, the reservation level of
the client, is equal to 0.
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Fig. 3. Quantity traded by the financial intermediary on behalf of clients
as a function of the number of informed traders.
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The figure shows the quantity y traded on behalf on the clients as a func-
tion of n = N − 1 where N is the number of informed traders and k, the
reservation level of the client, is equal to 0.
51
Fig. 4. The negative transfer function paid by the clients to the banks in
case of losses of the funds.
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The figure shows the transfer t1 as a function of n = N − 1 where N is the
number of informed traders and k, the reservation level of the client, is equal
to 0.
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Fig. 5. The positive transfer functions paid by the clients to the banks in
case of profits of the funds.
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The figure shows the transfer t2 = t3 as a function of n = N − 1 where N is
the number of informed traders and k, the reservation level of the client, is
equal to 0.
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Fig. 6. Expected aggregate profits as a function of the number of informed
traders when the banks can trade multiple positive quantities.
The figure shows the expected aggregate profit as a function of α1 the prob-
ability that the informed in state u buys y for the fund and and L − y for
his own account, α2 the probability that the informed trader buys −y for
the fund and y for his own account and 1− α1 − α2.
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